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A Robust Smart Card Based Anonymous User
Authentication Protocol for Wireless Communications
Abstract
Anonymous user authentication is an important but challenging task for
wireless communications. In a recent paper, Das proposed a smart card
based anonymous user authentication protocol for wireless communications.
The scheme can protect user privacy and is believed to be secure against a
range of network attacks even if the secret information stored in the smart
card is compromised. In this paper, we reanalyze the security of Das’ scheme,
and show that the scheme is in fact insecure against impersonation attacks.
We then propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication
protocol for wireless communications. Compared with the existing schemes,
our protocol uses a different user authentication mechanism which does not
require different entities to maintain a synchronized clock. We show that the
proposed new protocol can provide stronger security and better efficiency
and scalability than previous schemes.
Keywords: Remote user authentication; Mobile computing; Security;
Smart card; User anonymity; Wireless network
1. Introduction
In recent years, with the fast development of mobile technologies, wire-
less networks have become widely available and interconnected. Remote user
authentication is a fundamental research problem in wireless network secu-
rity. When the mobile users (MU) roams into a foreign network, the Foreign
Agent (FA) authenticates the roaming user with the help of the user’s Home
Agent (HA) [1, 7, 8].
As user privacy becomes a notable security issue in wireless communica-
tions, it is desirable to keep mobile users’ identities anonymous in the remote
user authentication process [12]. A lot of research work (e.g. [13, 6, 11, 2,
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4, 9]) has been done in the design and analysis of anonymous user authenti-
cation protocols for wireless communications. However, most of the existing
protocols were broken shortly after they were proposed, which shows the
non-trivialness of the task.
In a very recent paper [3], Das showed the security weaknesses in some
previous smart card based anonymous user authentication protocols. He
then proposed a new scheme which is believed to be secure against a range
of network attacks. However, in this paper, we show that there is also a
serious security flaw in Das’ anonymous user authentication scheme: an at-
tacker who has stolen a user’s smart card can successfully impersonate the
user without knowing other secrets (such as the identity or password) of the
user. Moreover, we show that Das’ scheme cannot provide the strong replay
resistance property which is claimed to be an advantage of his scheme over
previous schemes.
We then propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication
protocol for wireless communications. Our protocol makes use of a user
authentication mechanism which is different from the previous approaches
and can successfully prevent different kinds of network attacks. In addition,
the proposed scheme can achieve better efficiency and scalability compared
with other smart card based anonymous user authentication protocols in the
literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review Das’s
scheme. Then we show its weaknesses in Section 3. We then present our
new protocol in Section 4 and analyze its security in Section 5. We compare
the Performance of our new protocol with the previous schemes in Section 6.
The paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. Review of Das’s scheme
Let G = Zp denote a multiplication group and g a generator of G with
order q, where p and q are large primes such that p = 2q + 1. The HA
randomly selects a private key SHA = c ∈ Zq and computes the public
key PHA = g
c mod p. Similarly, the foreign agent FA selects a private key
SFA = e ∈ Zq and computes the public key PFA = ge mod p. We summarize
the notations used throughout the paper in Table 1.
Das’ smart card based anonymous authentication scheme consists of four
phases, namely registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, and
password change phase. We only review the first three phases.
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MU The mobile user
IDMU Identity of MU
PWMU Password of MU
HA Home agent of MU
IDHA Identity of HA
FA Foreign agent of MU
IDFA Identity of FA
N master secret key of HA
ctrMU A counter maintained by MU
SKA,B Session key shared between A and B
H(·) A secure collision-free one-way hash function
EK [M ] Encrypting a message M using a symmetric key K
DK [C] Decrypting a ciphertext C using a symmetric key K
SignSK [M ] Signing a message M using a private key SK
Table 1: Notations
2.1. Registration phase
Step1. The MU chooses his/her own identity IDMU and password PWMU ,
and generates a large random number d. Then he/she computes the hash
value f = H(IDMU ⊕ PWMU ⊕ d), and sends the registration message
IDMU , f to the HA over a secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving the message from IDMU , the HA computes TKMU =
H(N‖IDMU) ⊕ f using its own secret master key N , and r = IDHA ⊕
EN [IDMU‖m], where m is a random value which is different for each mo-
bile user MU. The HA then issues a smart card to MU which contains
(TKMU , H(·), r) over a secure channel.
Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, the MU securely stores d, f in the
smart card. Hence, the smart card would contain (TKMU , H(·), r, d, f).
2.2. Login phase
Step1. The MU first inserts his/her smart card into the device and then
enters his/her identity IDMU and password PW
∗
MU . The smart card then
computes f ∗ = H(IDMU⊕PW ∗MU⊕d) and verifies the equation f ∗ = f using
the stored value of f . If the equation holds, proceed to Step 2. Otherwise,
the login phase is terminated immediately.
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Step2. The smart card computes the value TK∗MU = TKMU⊕f = H(N‖IDMU).
The smart card then acquires the current timestamp TMU and generates a
random nonce RNMU . It further computes the followings: A = g
a mod p, F =
EL[TMU , RNMU , IDFA, A],M = EDH [r], where L = H(TMU ⊕ RNMU ⊕
TK∗MU) is a temporary key, a is a random number and DH = P
a
HA mod p =
gac mod p is the Diffie-Hellman key shared with the HA.
Step3. The smart card also computes DH ′ = P aFAmodp = g
ea mod p as
the Diffie-Hellman key shared with the FA. The MU then computes the
hash value H(TMU ⊕RNMU) and U = EDH′ [M,F, IDHA, TMU , RNMU ], and
sends the login request message (A,H(TMU⊕RNMU), U) to FA over a public
channel.
2.3. Authentication phase
Step 1. After receiving the login request message from the MU, the FA
computes DH ′ = Ae mod p = gea mod p and decrypts U using DH ′ to reveal
M,F, IDHA, TMU , RNMU . The FA now knows that the MU’s home agent is
HA.
Step 2. The FA verifies the validity of TMU . If it is valid, the FA computes
H(TMU ⊕ RNMU) and compares this value with the received value to ver-
ify the validity of RNMU . In order to protect replay attacks,The FA stores
(IDMU , RNMU) in its database. When the FA receives another login mes-
sage, say [A′, H(T ′MU ⊕ RN ′MU), U ′], it first retrieves random nonce RN ′MU
by decrypting U ′. If the timestamp T ′MU and the random nonce RN
′
MU are
valid, the FA matches the retrieved RN ′MU with the stored random nonce
RNMU corresponding to MU in its database. If the the two random numbers
match, the FA rejects this login request message. Otherwise, the FA replaces
the old random nonce RNMU by the new one RN
′
MU for the user MU in its
database.
Step 3. The FA computes B = gb mod p and DH ′′ = P bHA mod p = g
cb mod p
as the key shared with the HA, where b ∈ Zq is a secret random num-
ber generated by the FA. The FA acquires the current timestamp TFA and
generates a random nonce RNFA. The FA then computes a signature V =
SignSFA [H(A‖B‖M‖F‖TMU‖RNMU‖TFA‖RNFA‖CertFA)] where CertFA is
FA’s certificate and SFA is its private key, W = EDH′′ [A,B,M, F, TMU ,
RNMU , TFA, RNFA, V, CertFA] and H(TFA ⊕ RNFA). FA then sends the
message (B, H(TFA ⊕RNFA),W ) to the HA.
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Step 4. HA computes DDH′′ [W ] = (A,B,M, F, TMU , RNMU , TFA, RNFA, V,
CertFA), where DH
′′ = Bc mod p = gcb mod p. The HA verifies the validity
of TFA, RNFA, CertFA and FA’s signature V in turn. If these are valid,
the HA computes IDHA ⊕ DDH [M ] = EN [IDMU‖m] to reveal IDMU . By
searching IDMU in its database, the HA verify whether the MU is a legal
user or not.
Step 5. The HA computes L = H(TMU⊕RNMU⊕H(N‖IDMU)) and decrypts
F using L to reveal TMU , RNMU , IDFA, A. The HA checks whether the
decrypted TMU , RNMU and IDFA are correct. If any value is invalid, the HA
notifies the FA that MU is not a legal user. Otherwise, the HA goes to the
next Step. In addition, the HA adopted the same method as in Step 2 of the
Authentication Phase to prevent replay attacks.
Step 6. The HA computes D = gx mod p and the session secret key shared
with the FA as SKFA,HA = B
x mod p = gbx mod p, where x ∈ Zq is a
secret random number. Then, HA computes X = SignSHA [H(A‖B‖D‖THA
‖RNMU‖RNFA‖CertHA)], where SHA is the private key of HA, and Y =
ESKFA,HA [H(H(N‖IDMU)‖D)‖A‖B‖D‖THA‖RNMU‖RNFA‖X‖CertHA]. HA
computes the secret session key shared with MU as SKMU,HA = A
x mod p =
gax mod p. HA then sends the message (D,H(THA⊕RNMU ⊕RNFA), Y ) to
FA.
Step 7. FA computes SKFA,HA = D
b mod p = gbx mod p and decrypts Y to
retrieve the information H(H(N‖IDMU)‖D), A, B, D, THA, RNMU , RNFA, X,
CertHA. The FA then verifies the validity of THA, RNMU , RNFA by using the
received H(THA ⊕RNMU ⊕RNFA). If these are valid, FA verifies HA’s cer-
tificate CertHA and signature X. If they are also valid, FA proceeds to the
next Step.
Step 8. FA computes SKFA,MU = A
b mod p = gab mod p and Z =
ESKFA,MU [TCertMU‖H(H(N‖IDMU)‖D)‖A‖B‖D‖RNMU ] where TCertMU
is a temporary certificate for MU, and sends (B, H(RNMU), Z) to MU.
Step 9. MU computes the secret session key shared with FA as SKMU,FA =
Ba mod p = gab mod p and decrypts Z to retrieve TCertMU , H(H(N‖IDMU)‖D),
A,B,D,RNMU . MU computes H(RNMU) using RNMU generated in the lo-
gin phase and compares it with the received hash value H(RNMU). If they
match, MU verifies the certificate TCertMU using FA’s public key PFA. If
it is valid, MU computes H(H(N‖IDMU)‖D) using its computed TK∗MU =
H(N‖IDMU) in login phase and the retrieved value of D. If it matches with
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the decrypted H(H(N‖IDMU)‖D), MU confirms that FA is verified by HA.
Then MU computes the session key SKMU,HA = D
a mod p = gax mod p
shared with the HA for future secure communication.
3. Security Analysis of Das’s scheme
3.1. Security against Impersonation
In this section, we show that Das’s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation
attacks if a user’s smart card is stolen and an attacker has extracted all the
information (TKMU , H(·), r, d, f) stored in the smart card (e.g. by power
analysis [5, 10]). The attacker then impersonate the user MU as follows.
In login phase, the attacker acquires the current timestamp T ∗ and gener-
ates two random number RN∗, a∗. He/she then computes the following values
TK∗MU = TKMU ⊕ f = H(N‖IDMU), A∗ = ga
∗
mod p, L∗ = H(T ∗⊕RN∗⊕
TK∗MU), F
∗ = EL∗ [T ∗, RN∗, IDFA, A∗], DH∗ = P a
∗
HA = g
a∗c mod p, M∗ =
EDH∗ [r], DH
∗′ = P a
∗
FA = g
a∗e mod p, U∗ = EDH∗′ [M
∗, F ∗, IDHA, T ∗, RN∗],
and sends the login request message (A∗, H(T ∗ ⊕RN∗), U∗) to FA.
It is easy to see that the login request is in the correct format. Upon
receiving the request, FA and HA will execute the protocol normally and the
attacker will pass the authentication successfully. In the above attack, the
attacker needs to know the identity of the home agent HA. However, due
to the small number of home agents (compared with the number of mobile
users), the adversary can perform the attack simply by a brute-force search
on the possible home agents.
3.2. Security against Strong Replay Attack
In [3], Das claimed that timestamps are not an ideal solution to prevent re-
play attacks since replay attacks may still occur within the time period spec-
ified by the timestamps. He then proposed a new approach to avoid replay
attacks: FA and HA will store (IDMU , RNMU) and {(IDMU , IDFA), (RNMU ,
RNFA)} respectively in their databases. Later, when FA (or HA) receives a
new request, it will check if the random number in this new request is the
same as the one in its database. If they are the same, the request is identified
as a replay attack and will be rejected. Otherwise, the normal procedures
will be performed and the new random number will replace the old one in
the database.
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First of all, there is a mistake in Das’ scheme: such a procedure to prevent
replay attacks cannot be performed by FA since throughout the whole proto-
col the identity IDMU of a mobile user will never be revealed to FA. Secondly,
we believe such a strategy is still not strong enough to prevent replay attack
when considering the following attacking scenario: suppose MU executes two
sessions within a very short time interval such that the timestamp in the first
session is still valid when the second session has been completed. Since the
databases of FA and HA have been updated, the attacker can now replay the
first request in order to pass the authentication.
4. A New Smart Cased based Anonymous Authentication Protocol
We propose a new smart card based anonymous authentication proto-
col for wireless communications. Notably, the new protocol makes use of a
counter-based authentication mechanism to provide strong replay resistance.
The new protocol can also resist a range of attacks such as offline password
guessing attacks and impersonation attacks even if the smart card is stolen.
The system parameters p, q, g,G are the same as in Das’ scheme. Let
(PHA = g
c, SHA = c) and (PFA = g
e, SFA = e) denote the public and
private keys of HA and FA respectively. The new protocol has four phases:
registration, login, authentication, and password change.
4.1. Registration phase
1). The MU chooses his/her own identity IDMU and password PWMU ,
and generates a large random number d. He/she then computes the hash
value f = H(IDMU‖PWMU‖d), and sends the registration message IDMU , f
to the HA via a secure channel.
2). Upon receiving the request, HA computes TKMU = H(N‖IDMU)⊕f
using its own master secret key N , and r = IDHA ⊕ EN [IDMU‖m], where
m is a random value which is different for each mobile user. HA then initi-
ates a counter ctrMU = 0 for MU and creates a record (IDMU , ctrMU) in its
database. HA then issues a smart card to MU which contains (TKMU , H(·), r,
ctrMU) over a secure channel.
3). Upon receiving the smart card, MU computes the hash value f ∗ =
H(IDMU ⊕ PWMU ⊕ d), and stores f ∗, d in the smart card. So the smart
card contains (TKMU , H(·), r, ctrMU , f ∗, d).
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4.2. Login phase
1). MU first inserts his/her smart card into the device and then enters
his/her identity IDMU and password PW
∗
MU . The smart card then computes
f ∗
′
= H(IDMU ⊕ PW ∗MU ⊕ d) and verifies the condition f ∗
′
= f ∗ using the
stored value of f ∗. If the equation holds, the smart card ensures that MU
enters his/her identity and password correctly and proceed to the next step.
Otherwise, the login phase is terminated immediately.
2). The smart card computes TK∗MU = TKMU ⊕H(IDMU‖PWMU‖d) =
H(N‖IDMU), ctrMU = ctrMU + 1, A = ga mod p, F = EL[ctrMU , IDFA, A],
M = EDH [r], where L = H(ctrMU ⊕ TK∗MU) is a temporary key, a ∈ Zq is a
random number and DH = P aHA = g
ac mod p is a Diffie-Hellman key shared
with HA.
3). The smart card also computes DH ′ = P aFA = g
ea mod p as the Diffie-
Hellman key shared with FA, and U = EDH′ [M,F, IDHA, ctrMU ], and sends
the login request message (A,U) to FA over a public channel.
4.3. Authentication phase
Upon receiving the login request message (A,U) from the MU, the FA
and the HA perform the following steps.
1). FA computes DH ′ = Ae = gea mod p and decrypts U using DH ′ to
recover M,F, IDHA, ctrMU . Then FA knows that MU’s home agent is HA.
2). FA → HA : (B, W ). FA computes B = gb mod p and DH ′′ =
P bHA = g
cb mod p as the key shared with the HA, where b ∈ Zq is a random
number generated by the FA. FA then computes V = SignSFA [H(A‖B‖M‖F
‖CertFA‖ctrMU)] and W = EDH′′ [A,B,M, F, V, CertFA, ctrMU ], where SFA
is the private key of FA and CertFA is its certificate. Then FA sends the
message (B, W ) to HA.
3). Upon receiving the message (B, W ) from FA, HA computes DDH′′ [W ] =
(A,B,M, F, V, CertFA, ctrMU), where DH
′′ = Bc = gcb mod p. The HA
verifies CertFA and FA’s signature V using FA’s public key PFA included
in CertFA. If they are valid, the HA computes DN [IDHA ⊕ DDH [M ]] =
IDMU‖m to recover IDMU . By matching IDMU in its database, the HA
verify whether the MU is a legal user or not. If IDMU doesn’t exist then HA
notifies FA that MU is not a legal user.
4). HA computes L = H(ctrMU ⊕H(N‖IDMU)) and decrypts F using L
to recover (ctrMU , IDFA, A). HA checks whether the decrypted ctrMU , A and
IDFA are same as the received ctrMU , A and the identity of FA in CertFA.







Figure 1: Message Flows in Authentication Phase.
In order to prevent replay attacks, the HA also verifies the retrieved ctrMU
with the stored counter ctr′MU corresponding to IDMU . If ctrMU > ctr
′
MU
then the HA replaces ctr′MU with ctrMU in its database and proceeds to the
next step. Otherwise, HA notifies FA that the user authentication fails.
5). HA → FA : (D,Y ). The HA computes D = gx mod p and the
session secret key shared with the FA as SKFA,HA = B
x = gbx mod p
where x ∈ Zq is a random number generated by HA. HA then computes
X = SignSHA [H(A‖B‖D‖CertHA)] and Y = ESKFA,HA [H(H(N‖IDMU)‖A
‖B‖D)‖A‖B‖D‖X‖CertHA] where SHA is the private key of the HA and
CertHA is its certificate. HA also computes the secret session key shared
with MU as SKMU,HA = A
x = gax mod p. HA then sends the message
(D,Y ) to FA.
6). Upon receiving the message (D,Y ) from HA. FA computes SKFA,HA =
Db = gbx mod p and decrypts Y to recover the values H(H(N‖IDMU)‖A‖B‖D),
A,B,D,X, CertHA. FA verifies HA’s certificate CertHA and signature X. If
they are valid, FA proceeds to the next Step.
7). FA → MU : (B, Z). FA computes SKFA,MU = Ab = gab mod p
and Z = ESKFA,MU [CertFA‖TCertMU‖H(H(N‖IDMU)‖A‖B‖D)‖A‖B‖D],
where TCertMU is a temporary certificate for MU. FA then sends (B, Z) to
the MU.
8). MU computes the secret session key shared with the FA as SKMU,FA =
Ba = gab mod p and uses it to decrypt Z to recover TCertMU , H(H(N‖IDMU)
‖A‖B‖D), A, B, D. The MU then verifies CertFA and the temporary certifi-
cate TCertMU using the public key PFA of FA. If the verification is success-
ful, MU computes H(TK∗MU‖A‖B‖D) and compares it with the decrypted
H(H(N‖IDMU)‖A‖B‖D). If the two values are equal, MU accepts the ses-
sion and computes SKMU,HA = D
a = gax mod p as the session key shared
with HA.
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4.4. Password change phase
1) MU inserts his/her smart card into the device and enters his/her iden-
tity IDMU and old password PW
old
MU .
2) The smart card computes f ∗
′
= H(IDMU ⊕ PW oldMU ⊕ d) and veri-
fies the condition f ∗
′
= f ∗ using the stored f ∗. If the equation does not
hold, the smart card rejects the password change request. Otherwise, MU
enters his/her new password PW newMU . The smart card computes f
∗′′ =
H(IDMU ⊕ PW newMU ⊕ d) and TKnewMU = TKoldMU ⊕ H(IDMU‖PW oldMU‖d) ⊕




5. Security Analysis of The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we show that our proposed scheme can resist different
types of attacks and provide user anonymity.
5.1. User Anonymity
From Figure 1, we can see that the communication transcript reveals
no information about the identity IDMU of the user. First of all, A =
ga, B = gb, D = gx are all random numbers which are not related to IDMU .
Secondly, U,W, Y and Z are all ciphertexts encrypted under different Diffie-
Hellman keys. Because of the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem,
the adversary is unable to decrypt U,W, Y or Z to recover the encrypted
message.
From the view point of the foreign agent FA, it can decrypt U to recover
(M,F, IDHA, ctrMU) and decrypt Y to recover (H(H(N‖IDMU)‖A‖B‖D),
A,B,D, X,CertHA). Since M and F are ciphertexts which can only be de-
crypted by HA, FA will not learn any information about IDMU from these
values. Also, since the hash function H is one-way, FA cannot learn the iden-
tity of MU from H(H(N‖IDMU)A‖B‖‖D). Finally, X = SignSHA [H(A‖B‖D
‖CertHA)] also reveals no information about IDMU to FA. Therefore, the for-
eign agent is not able to recover the identity of MU.
5.2. Security against Impersonation
We consider three types of impersonation attacks, namely MU imperson-
ation attack, FA impersonation attack, and HA impersonation attack.
MU Impersonation. In order to impersonate the MU, the adversary must
obtain the value of H(N‖IDMU). We then consider two situations: (1) the
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adversary compromises the user identity and password but the smart card is
secure; and (2) the adversary compromises the smart card but the the user
identity and password are secure.
In the first case, it is obvious that adversary is unable to obtain the value
of H(N‖IDMU) since the smart card is secure. Notice that H(N‖IDMU)
is concealed in TKMU = H(N‖IDMU) ⊕ H(IDMU‖PWMU‖d) in the smart
card. Since the smart card is secure, the adversary is unable to obtain TKMU
or H(N‖IDMU).
In the second case, when the smart card is stolen and compromised, the
adversary can learn the values of (TKMU , H(·), r, ctrMU , f ∗, d) in the smart
card. However, this time the adversary knows neither IDMU nor PWMU , and
again she cannot compute the value of H(N‖IDMU). We must also consider
offline password guessing attacks in this case, that is the adversary uses
a brute force search to find out the correct password. In the proposed anony-
mous authentication scheme, the user identity is protected against outsiders
and the FA, this can help prevent the password guessing attack. Since there
can be a huge number of users in the mobile system, it is infeasible for an
adversary to do an exhaustive search for all the possible (ID, password) pairs.
However, we remark that if the user ID space is small, then offline password
guessing attack would become feasible if the smart card of a user is stolen
and compromised by the attacker.
It is worth noting that FA can also learn the value of (H(H(N‖IDMU)‖A
‖B‖D) in the authentication phase. However, due to the one-wayness of the
hash function, FA is unable to obtain the value of H(N‖IDMU).
FA/HA Impersonation. Since FA and HA uses digital signatures to authen-
ticate each other, the adversary is unable to impersonate either of them due
to the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme. Also, it is infeasible for
FA to impersonate HA to the mobile user since the mobile user will verify
the message (H(H(N‖IDMU)‖A‖B‖D) in order to make sure that the value
of D is indeed generated by the HA.
5.3. Strong Replay Resistance
We have used the counter based authentication mechanism to prevent
replay attacks. The advantage of using this mechanism compared with the
timestamp approach is that we don’t require different parties in the system
to maintain a synchronized clock. It also can prevent the replay attack
presented in Section 3.2.
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It is obvious that if the adversary replays the first or second message, then
HA will detect the attack when examining the counter ctrMU of the user MU.
For third and fourth messages, we used the challenge-response mechanism to
prevent replay attack. In the third message, the signature X is generated
by HA based on the challenge B sent by FA, and in the fourth message, the
authentication token (H(H(N‖IDMU)‖A‖B‖D) is generated based on the
challenge A sent by MU. Therefore, the adversary cannot replay any message
in the protocol.
5.4. Secure Key Establishment and Forward Secrecy
At the end of the protocol, the MU will establish a session key SKMU,FA =
Ba = gab mod p with FA, and another session key SKMU,HA = D
a =
gax mod p with HA. Since all the messages are protected against imper-
sonation and replay attacks, the MU can guarantee that the session keys are
established with the intended peer entities. Due to the intractability of the
Diffie-Hellman problem, the adversary is unable to derive any session key
from the values of A,B,D.
It is also worth noting that the proposed protocol achieves perfect forward
secrecy. Since the values of A,B,D are freshly generated in each session, all
the past session keys will remain secure even if the long-terms secret keys are
compromised at a later stage.
6. Performance Comparison
We compare our new scheme with two recently proposed smart card based
anonymous user authentication schemes due to Das [3] and Li et al. [9]. In
Table 2, we provide the comparison based on the key security and usability
features of these schemes, while in Table 3, we compare their efficiency.
From the tables, we can see that our proposed scheme provides better
security and usability than the other two schemes. In particular, one special
feature of our scheme is that we don’t require all the parties (namely MU, FA,
and HA) in the system to maintain a synchronized clock. This is important
in the wireless roaming scenario since clients and servers in different domains
may use different clocks. Therefore, our scheme is more scalable than the
previous schemes.
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Feature Li et al. [9] Das [3] Ours
Correct Password Update No Yes Yes
Server Knows No Password Yes Yes Yes
No Synchronized Clock No No Yes
User Anonymity Yes Yes Yes
Mutual Authentication Yes No Yes
Strong Replay Resistance No No Yes
Key Agreement Yes Yes Yes
Forward Secrecy Yes Yes Yes
Table 2: Security and Usability Comparison
Li et al. [9] Das [3] Ours
Modular Exponentiation 6+6pre∗ 6+6pre 6+6pre
Hash Operation 10 15 10
Symmetric-key Encryption 6 6 6
Symmetric-key Decryption 7 7 7
Signature Generation 2 2 2
Signature Verification 2 2 2
* pre denotes pre-computation
Table 3: Efficiency Comparison
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed some security flaws in a recently proposed smart
card based anonymous user authentication scheme. We also proposed a new
scheme which can achieve stronger security and better usability than the
existing schemes without sacrificing efficiency. Our scheme does not require
entities in different domains to maintain a synchronized clock, and hence is
more suitable for wireless roaming networks.
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